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cess. A lack of submissions could still result in less invalid patents
and applications, and it would not have a side effect of bogging down
the examiner with inapplicable submissions. The Patent Reform Act
of 2011 requires applicants to submit stronger applications for fear of
an invalidating third-party submission. This will result in less litigation and less invalid patents and applications. Small companies should
not fear opposition from larger companies because the system imposes limitations on the number of observations third parties can
submit. Also, if small companies submit strong applications, they
should not fear litigation because their patents will be less likely to be
invalid.
Although the Patent Reform Act of 2011 's amendment to 35
U.S.C. § 122 does not fix all of the USPTO examination deficiencies,
or even be as good as Article 115 EPC, it should still improve USPTO
efficiency and patent validity. Thus, Congress took a step in the right
direction by passing the Patent Reform Act of 2011.

2 OBSCENITY STANDARDS, 1 NEAT
SOLUTION: HOW GEOTARGETING
EXTENDS TRADITIONAL OBSCENITY
LAW TO THE INTERNET
J. Mason Kjar

ABSTRACT

The First Amendment guarantees the right to free speech-but
that protection is not absolute. Some speech is banned outright, such
as child pornography. Other speech is nearly fully protected, such as
erotic speech. Caught in the middle of the two is obscene speech,
which can be owned in the privacy of one's home, but cannot be disseminated publicly.
The line between obscenity and eroticism is hard to pinpoint, and
varies from community to community. In general, the process of analyzing whether a work is obscene includes asking whether the content
violates the community standards of the local geographic area where
the material was published. Thus, for most media, publishers of potentially obscene content must choose the communities into which they
publish, or face criminal charges from the least tolerant communities.
But for online media, the Supreme Court remains undecided whether
the obscenity analysis should use the local community standard. The
Court's doubts stem from the Internet's global reach and lack of control over who receives free online content. For example, if a work is
nationally-available online, and is judged using the same legal standard as in other traditional media, any local community offended by
the content has the power of a heckler's veto to make the publisher
liable for distributing obscenity.
This Note explains why the use of a new online technology resolves the question of whether local community standards should be
used to judge online content. Called geotargeting, the technology creates borders on the previously borderless Internet, which allows publishers to specifically target geographically localized communities,
thereby excluding areas where the material might lead to criminal
charges. This new power to publish potentially obscene materials only
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to selected communities drastically reduces the constitutional concerns of applying traditional obscenity law to online content.
INTRODUCTION: "2 GIRLS 1 CUP" AND THE LINE
BETWEEN LEGAL EROTICISM AND ILLEGAL OBSCENITY

Indecency, vulgarity, obscenity-these are strictly confined to
man; he invented them. Among the higher animals there is no
trace of them. 1
- Mark Twain
Generally, most erotic material can be published publicly, given
certain restrictions. For example, publishing erotic videos of a female's nude breasts .and buttocks does not amount to criminal sanctions in any jurisdiction as long as basic guidelines of age, location,
and time are met. 2 In contrast, it is a federal crime to publish obscene
material in public. 3 Unfortunately, there is no clear or consistent
boundary between erotic and obscene material. 4 In some jurisdictions,
distributing material showing violent and depraved acts may constitute a criminal violation of obscenity laws. 5 But jurisdictions differ
1

MARK Tw AIN, The Damned Human Race, in LETIERS FROM THE EARTH:
UNCENSORED WRITINGS, 219, 235 (Bernard DeVoto ed., Harper Perennial Modem
Classics 2004) (1962).
2
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206, 213-14 (1975) (allowing a nude film to be broadcast where the public may see it, even considering the
risk to children, traffic, or offended persons); see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974) (holding that mere nudity is not obscenity).
3
18 U.S.C. §§ 1460 (2006) (criminalizing the distribution of obscene material).
4
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (stating that the Court's attempts to define obscenity over the years were "tortured" because it was so difficult to
land on a definition); William A. Huston, Under Color of Law: Obscenity vs. the First
Amendment, 10 NEXUS 75, 78-79 (2005) (arguing that attempting to define obscenity is an exercise in futility because definitions are subjective, vary so widely between
individuals and communities, and are inherently paradoxical, and because imposing a
rigid definition smacks of tyranny).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Extreme Assoc., 431F.3d150, 151 (3d Cir.
2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1143 (2006) (finding the publishers of murder/rape pornography videos guilty of distributing obscenity online); see also Brief for the United
States at 7 n.2, United States v. Extreme Assoc., 431F.3d150 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 051555), 2005 WL 6104849 at *7 n.2 (describing the videos upon which the obscenity
charges against Extreme Associates were based, including porn films that were intended only for sexual gratification and portrayed the extremely graphic rape and
murder of three women by a serial killer); BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE
LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING 56 (2007) ("The Extreme
Associates website describes [one of the videos upon which obscenity charges were
based] as 'the most controversial movie' in their 'video arsenal': 'A Stunningly Dis-
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about whether it is criminally obscene to distribute material that is
merely gross. 6 Such non-violent videos depicting sickening (but ultimately non-violent) acts may or may not be obscene; it all depends on
who defines obscenity. And more recently, obscenity is even harder to
define when it is distributed online.
For example, consider the online distribution of the scatologically
themed Brazilian video "2 Girls 1 Cup," a viral video that rose in
popularity in 2007. The video depicts two women using excrement to
engage in extreme sex acts, ostensibly for the sexual gratification of
the viewers. 7 Soon after its online release, viewers began recording
and posting their reactions while watching the video. 8 The viewers'
shocked reactions to the video became so popular that references to
the "2 Girls 1 Cup" video began to appear in advertisements, 9 movies
turbing Look at a Serial Killer, Satanic Rituals, and the Depths of Human Depravity."').
6
See, e.g., Will Femia, User Generated Failure, MsNBC.COM (Nov. 28,
2007, 4:58 PM), http://clicked.today.com/_news/2007 /11/28/4354948-user-generatedfailure (explaining technology, politics, and the 2 Girls 1 Cup reaction videos); 2Girls1 Cup: The Real Poop, THESMOKINGGUN.COM (Nov. 30, 2007),
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/revolting/2-girls-1-cup-real-poop (ex-

plaining the history of the 2 Girls 1 Cup creator and 2 Girls 1 Cup media and
video reactions).
7

See Hungry Bitches-2 Girls 1 Cup-R33, MFXMEDIA.COM,
http://www.mfxmedia.com/mfxshop/hungry-bitches-girls-p-596.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2011) (selling the 2 Girls 1 Cup video).
8
Michael Agger, 2 Girls 1 Cup 0 Shame, SLATE.COM (last updated Jan. 31,
2008, 4:20 PM) http://www.slate.com/id/2182833/ (explaining the "phenomenon" of
people recording their reactions to 2 Girls 1 Cup); Femia, supra note 6.
9
Heidi Blake, Coca-Cola Accused of Using Porn to Target Children on
Facebook, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (July 19, 2010, 7:30 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/7897706/Coca-Cola-accused-ofusing-pom-to-target-children-on-Facebook.html (reporting how references to "2 Girls
1 Cup" were used by Coca-Cola's ad agency in an online marketing campaign for Dr.
Pepper); Vikram Dodd, Coca-Cola Forced to Pull Facebook Promotion After Porn
References, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (July 18, 2010, 6:51 PM),
http://www.guardian.co. uk/business/201 O/jul/18/coca-cola-facebook-promotion-pom
(reporting that Coca-Cola's use of references to "2 Girls 1 Cup" encouraged a 14year-old British girl to search online for the scat-porn video); Laura Shunk, CocaCola apologizes for Dr. Pepper's "2Girls1 Cup" Facebook snafu, DENVER
WESTWORD, (July 20, 2010, 1:13 PM),
http://blogs.westword.com/cafesociety/2010/07 /coca-cola_pulls_pom-laced_fac. php
(reporting how references to "2 Girls 1 Cup" were used by Coca-Cola's ad agency in
an online marketing campaign for Dr. Pepper); Ken Wheaton & Emily Bryson York,
Quiznos: We Did Not Hop on Poop-Porn Bandwagon, ADAGE.COM (May 19, 2009,
4:10 PM), http://adage.com/adages/post?article_id=136753 (reporting on the advertisement run by Playboy in which two bikini-clad women perform the similar actions
as those shown in "2 Girls 1 Cup" while sharing a sandwich, which many viewers
mistook as a Quizno's advertisement).
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and television shows, 10 video games, 11 online humor sites, 12 and even
13
on tee-shirts. "2 Girls 1 Cup" has been commented on by a number
14
of entertainers, and has garnered media attention from well-known
15
sources such as Slate, VHl, 16 and Esquire. 17 The "2 Girls 1 Cup"
video remains available online. 18
Contrast the online success of "2 Girls 1 Cup" with very similar
scatologically themed videos that have generated criminal sanctions
when they were distributed through traditional media (such as radio,
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television, or mail). 19 For example, Mr. Danilo Simoes Croce, a Brazilian citizen living in Florida, was indicted in 2006 for distributing
21
obscene hardcopy videos20 that displayed paraphilic acts of cop24
rolagnia, 22 urolagnia, 23 and vomerophilia, very similar to those de25
picted in "2 Girls 1 Cup." Mr. Croce pied guilty to the obscenity
\
charges. 26
What is even more startling is that soon after Mr. Croce returned
home to Brazil, it was his company that produced and distributed the
"2 Girls 1 Cup" trailer video, and to date, it appears no one has been
27
charged for its distribution online.

10

Family Guy: Back to the Woods (FOX Television broadcast Apr. 13, 2008)
(showing Stewie-one of the sitcom's main characters-reacting to 2Girls1 Cup);
SUPERHERO MOVIE (Dimension Films 2008).
11
Harwin, Transcript for "The Lazlow Show" on Integrity 2.0 Radio Station
from Grand Theft Auto IV: Episodes from Liberty City, GAMEFAQS.COM,
http://www.gamefaqs.com/ps3/933036-grand-theft-auto-iv/faqs/53042 (last visited
Nov. 13, 2011) (detailing the in-game mock radio show in which the announcer references 2 Girls 1 Cup); Ludwig Kietzmann, DiRT 2 Achievement Takes Off-Putting
Meme Off-Road, JOYSTIQ.COM (Aug. 12, 2009, 7:00 PM),
http://www.joystiq.com/2009/08/12/dirt-2-achievement-takes-off-putting-meme-offroad (describing the in-game achievement requiring a player to win two team events
with the same female teammate);.
12
2 Girls 1 Cop, ATOM.COM (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://www.atom.com/funny_videos/two_girls_one_cop/; Moments Before Cup
Chicks, COLLEGEHUMOR.COM (Jan. 7, 2008),
http://www.collegehumor.com/video: 1796348 (showing a parody of behind the

scenes at 2 Girls 1 Cup).
13

2 Girls 1 Cup Tee Shirts, ZAZZLE.COM,
http://www.zazzle.com/2_girls_l_cup_tshirt-235778664 l l 7482178 (last visited Nov.
13, 2011) (selling 2 Girls 1 Cup tee-shirts).
14
John Mayer, 2Guys1 Cup, JoHNMAYER.COM (Nov. 7, 2007)
http://www.johnmayer.com/blog/permalink/1560 (showing John Mayer's parody of
"2 Girls 1 Cup," in which he and a friend eat a cup of Pinkberry frozen yogurt); Joe
Rogan, Joe Rogan Watches 2Girls1 Cup and BME Pain Olympics, YouTUBE.COM
(Nov. 14, 2007) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZhevNNIBDnQ#t=Om30s (showing former host of Fear Factor Joe Rogan' s reaction to the 2 Girls 1 Cup Video, in
which he gags, looks away, and nearly leaves the room); A.J. Jacobs, The 9:10 to
Crazyland, ESQUIRE.COM (Mar. 17, 2008, 2:40 PM)
http://www.esquire.com/features/george-clooney-2-girls- l-cup-0408-3 (detailing an
interview with George Clooney in which an Esquire.com reporter shows the "2 Girls
1 Cup" video to Mr. Clooney, who gags, leaves the room, and says watching the
video is "like the rodeo-see how long you can last").
15
Agger, supra note 8.
16
Best Week Ever: Moral Bankruptcy, VHl.COM (Vhl television Broadcast
Nov. 16, 2007) excerpt available at http://www.vhl.com/video/misc/190222/bestweek-ever-full-act-4.jhtml (showing a video of the Best Week Ever and comi-

cally asserting that "moral bankruptcy" had its best week ever due to the viral
spread of the "2 Girls 1 Cup" video).
17
18

Jacobs, supra note 14.
See Hungry Bitches-2Girls1 Cup-R33, supra note 7.

19
See Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at *7 n.2 (describing the
hardcopy videos that led to obscenity charges against Extreme Associates, including
drinking body fluids); see Indictment at 2--4, United States v. Isaacs, 2008 WL
4346780 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 2:07-CR-00732), 2007 WL 5238823 (listing the titles
of the hardcopy videos leading to obscenity charges against Mr. Isaacs).
.
20
Criminal Complaint at 3-15, United States v. Croce, No. 6:06-mJ-01337DAB (M.D. Fla. Sep 5, 2006), ECF No. I.
21
See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, at Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders, Paraphilias, Diagnostic Features (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed. 2000) (defi~ing
the sexual disorder of paraphilia as, "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies,
sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the s~ffering
or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or other nonconsentmg persons .... ")[hereinafter DSM-IV]; Joel S. Milner et al., Paraphilia Not Otherwise
Specified: Psychology and Theory, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND
TREATMENT 384-85 (2008) (defining paraphilia and describing its first use by psychologists as a "replacement for the legal term 'perversion"').
22 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 588 (William
A. Nielson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1934) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY] (defining
coprolagnia as "[s]exual excitement produced by contact with feces."); see Milner,
supra note 21, at 395; see also DSM-IV, supra note 21, at 302.9 Parap~lias Not
Otherwise Specified (listing "coprophilia (feces)" as a form of sexual disorder).
23 WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 2805 (defining urolagnia as
"[s]ex excitement associated with urination."); see Milner, supra note 21, at 395 (defining urophilia and urolagnia in their various forms); see also DSM-IV, supra note
21, at 302.9 Paraphilias Not Otherwise Specified (listing "urophilia (urine)" as a form
of sexual disorder).
24 Milner, supra note 21, at 398 (stating vomerophilia is the "paraphilic focus
" on the regurgitation process" in which another individual is vomited on for sexual
gratification).
.
. .
25 Compare Hungry Bitches-2 Girls 1 Cup-R33, supra note 7, with Cnffilnal Complaint, supra note 20.
26 Corrected Judgment In a Criminal Case at 1-3, United States v. Croce, No.
6:06-cr-00182-GAP-DAB (M.D. Fla. Sep 5, 2006), ECF No. 108 (ordering Mr. Croce
to forfeit $98,000 in profits from the distribution of the films, and sentencing h~m to
time-served plus three years of unsupervised release, provided he leave the Umted
States and not return).
27 Both the short video "2 Girls 1 Cup" and the full-length video from which
"2 Girls 1 Cup" is excerpted are available for online purchase anywhere in the United
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WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 588 (William
A. Nielson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1934) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY] (defining
coprolagnia as "[s]exual excitement produced by contact with feces."); see Milner,
supra note 21, at 395; see also DSM-IV, supra note 21, at 302.9 Parap~ilias Not
Otherwise Specified (listing "coprophilia (feces)" as a form of sexual disorder).
23 WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 2805 (defining urolagnia as
"[s]ex excitement associated with urination."); see Milner, supra note 21, at 395 (defining urophilia and urolagnia in their various forms); see also DSM-IV, supra note
21, at 302.9 Paraphilias Not Otherwise Specified (listing "urophilia (urine)" as a form
of sexual disorder).
24 Milner, supra note 21, at 398 (stating vomerophilia is the "paraphilic focus
" on the regurgitation process" in which another individual is vomited on for sexual
gratification).
.
. .
25 Compare Hungry Bitches-2Girls1 Cup-R33, supra note 7, with Cnminal Complaint, supra note 20.
26 Corrected Judgment In a Criminal Case at 1-3, United States v. Croce, No.
6:06-cr-00182-GAP-DAB (M.D. Fla. Sep 5, 2006), ECF No. 108 (ordering Mr. Croce
to forfeit $98,000 in profits from the distribution of the films, and sentencing ~m to
time-served plus three years of unsupervised release, provided he leave the Umted
States and not return).
27 Both the short video "2 Girls 1 Cup" and the full-length video from which
"2 Girls 1 Cup" is excerpted are available for online purchase anywhere in the United
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So why are some videos considered illegal when distributed via
traditional media, but are tolerated when distributed online? The answer is linked to the confusion regarding how obscenity law applies to
the Internet. For most media, jurors draw upon local community standards to determine if a work appeals to an unwholesome sexual desire
and is so patently offensive that it should be criminal to distribute the
28
work. This "local community standard" is used to judge works that
are published through traditional media such as books, mailings, radio
shows, television broadcasts, and telephone messages. 29 For example,
if a publisher broadcasts an obscene film over the television, at trial a
juror will apply the community standards of the juror's local geographic area. 30
However, for works distributed online, it is unclear whether local
community standards should be used, and opposing viewpoints exist
on how obscenity should be judged online. A recent pair of cases has
highlighted how courts have split over online obscenity. 31 The Ninth
Circuit recently held that because posting content onto the Internet
makes the content available nationwide, jurors should judge the work
using nationwide standards for obscenity, rather than limiting themselves to the standards of the local community in which the jurors
32
live. Under that approach, a juror using a nationalized standard
could protect an obscene work that the local community would have
otherwise banned (or even ban a work that the local community would
have otherwise tolerated).
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit held that when judging
whether an online work is obscene, jurors should apply a local community standard as defined by a small area around the place where the
States. See supra note 7. This is in contrast to the websites that originally hosted the
other scat-porn videos upon which Mr. Croce's obscenity charges were based. See
Criminal Complaint, supra note 20, at 3; see, e.g.,
http://www.dragonfilms.eom.br/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (showing the site no
longer exists). It is also in contrast to other similarly themed websites where obscene
content was successfully prosecuted. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159,
169 (11th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., http://www.maxhardcore.com (last visited Nov. 13,
2011) (showing a website that has been forfeited to the U.S. Government pursuant to
an obscenity conviction); see also infra Part III.B.
28
This is just one prong of the test for obscenity. See infra Part II.A; see also
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The other prongs are whether the material is patently offensive or has value other than sexual excitation. Id. Those additional aspects of obscenity law are beyond the scope of this Note.
29
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; infra Part II.A.
30
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; infra Part II.A.
31
See infra Parts II.B, III.
32
United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009); see infra
Part III.A.
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work was downloaded (similar to the standard used in all other media).33 Under that local standard, a producer of potentially obscene
material in Hollywood who makes his content nationally available
online could be charged with obscenity in Florida, and the jury would
disregard whether the work would have been tolerated in Hollywood,
applying only local, Floridian community standards.
Choosing one standard over the other raises fundamental questions concerning free speech on the Internet. If local community standards are used, Internet publishers who make their material available
worldwide can be charged for "distributing obscene material when
someone downloads the obscene work in a community where the
work is not tolerated. 34 However, if national standards are used, some
communities could be forced to tolerate works they consider to be
obscene material, while other communities could be required to pun35
ish the distribution of works they consider to be free speech. The
stakes are high because under present conditions, the application of
either standard will impact someone's use of online media.
36
This issue has been presented to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the
Internet's disregard of geographic boundaries paralyzed the Court's
willingness to decide whether local standards should be applied to
Internet obscenity cases. 37 For older forms of media, the Court previously decided that local standards were the more reasonable approach.38 Although the Court noted problems of chilled speech under
either standard, it felt that the local standard was less chilling because
geographic controls associated with each medium allowed publishers
of potentially obscene material to tailor their messages based on the
. . 39
targete d commumtles.

33

United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 162-64 (11th Cir. 2010); see
infra Part III.B.
34
See Matthew Towns, Note, The Community Standards of Utah and the
Amish Country Rule the World Wide Web, 68 Mo. L. REv. 735, 740-43 (2003) (explaining how under a local standard online speech would be chilled by giving the
least-tolerant community a heckler's veto); see also infra note 141 and accompanying
text.
35
See John V. Edwards, Note, Obscenity in the Age of Direct Broadcast
Satellite: A Final Burial for Stanley v. Georgia(?), a National Obscenity Standard,
and Other Miscellany, 33 WM. &MARYL REV. 949, 992 (1992) ("[A national standard] compromis[es] the interests of both the least tolerant and the most tolerant
communities."); see also infra note 141 and accompanying text.
36
Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also infra Part
I
II.B.
37
See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. 564; infra Part II.
38
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973); infra Part II.A.
39
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; infra Part II.A.
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But the Internet is different-there are no central controls over
where online content is distributed in the United States. This lack of
control has lead to fractured ambivalence among Supreme Court Justices over whether a national or local standard approach should be
used when judging online content. 40
Enter "geotargeting," a new means by which online publishers
can control where their content is accessible. 41 This advance in technology heralds the resolution of the debate over whether local community standards should be applied to the Internet because publishers
will be able to tailor their messages to the communities into which
they wish to distribute their content, just as they have in all other media. The Court and many other courts have oft lamented that publishers of online content had no control over where their material was
42
downloaded. Geotargeting promises to be the white knight that can
rescue obscenity law from its current paralysis over what to do with
the Internet.
. This Note explains how the use of geotargeting resolves the questlo~ of whether local community standards should be used to judge
onlme content. Part II of this Note provides a background of traditional obscenity law and the Supreme Court's indecision over whether
local community standards should apply to obscenity on the Internet.
Part III ~etails ho~ two United States Courts of Appeals have split
ov~r onlme obscemty and discusses the rationales for applying the
national and local obscenity standards to the Internet. Part IV analyzes
how geotargeting technology makes applying local standards to the
Internet more reasonable than applying national standards, and proposes a modified local standard that can be applied to online obscenity. Part V concludes with predictions on the use of geotargeting technology and how the Court can apply traditional obscenity law to the
Internet.
I. BACKGROUND: A PRIMER ON PRURIENCE

2 OBSCENITY STANDARDS, 1 NEAT SOLUTION

2011]

- Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
Obscenity is not protected speech. 44 Under the First Amendment
to the Constitution, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech .... "45 The strong language used in the First
Amendment seems to imply that freedom of speech covers every kind
of speech or expression. However, "it is well understood that the right
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances."46 Certain kinds of speech may be classified as illegal, and a
47
person may be punished for publishing such speech. Obscene "utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."48 Obscenity law's foundations seem clear enough, but
the application of legal standards to obscenity has a long and troubled
history. 49 After a number of iterations, the Court finally settled on a
50
definition in the case of Miller v. California.
Part II.A discusses the Miller test for obscenity, how the Court
decided to allow local communities to determine obscenity standards
(rather than impose a national standard), and how the Court extended
the local community standard for obscenity to nearly every form of
communication. Part II.B then examines the Court's fragmented decision in Ashcroft v. ACLU and how the Internet's independence from
real-world geography caused the Court to doubt whether local community standards should extend to online content.

A. Miller and the Precedent for Local Community Standards:
Why the Court Agrees it is All About Location, Location,
Location

44

Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
47 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1460-1470 (2006) (criminalizing the distribution of obscene material).
48 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
49 Miller, 413 U.S. at 20-23 (reviewing the highlights of "the somewhat
tortured history of the Court's obscenity decisions"); see also Chris Hunt, Community
Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1278-83 (1978) (describing in greater detail the history of obscenity law prior to Miller); GEORGE B.
DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET§ 12.01, 12-4 to 12-8 (2010)
(giving a very detailed history of obscenity law).
50
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
45

[S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests. 43
~

.

.

See infra Part II.B; see generally Ronald P. Reid, Case Note, Ashcroft v.
America~ Civil Liberties Union, 7 JONES L. REv. 95, 103-11 (2003).
See infra Part IV.
:: See infra, notes 97 & 120 and accompanying text.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957); cf WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY: supra no~e 22, at 1829 (defining "prurient" as "longings marked by
restless cravmg ... havmg or easily susceptible to lascivious thoughts or desires.").
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In Miller, the Court specified three criteria to decide whether or
not a publication is protected free speech or unprotected obscenity. 51
One of the criteria asks "whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the alleged obscene
material appeals to an unwholesome sexual interest. 52 In Miller, the
Court explained that the local community into which a work had been
published gets to define the line between eroticism and obscenity using its local community standards. 53 Thus it is the recipient community, represented by jurors in a trial, that judges whether speech is
outside the protection of the First Amendment. 54
The Court ultimately rejected a uniform national standard.55 Instead, the Court felt that community standards

are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too
big and diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such
standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. . ..
[T]o structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national "community standard" would be an exercise in futility. 56
The Court determined a national community standard was "unreasonable" because it "is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to
read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or
Mississippi accept the depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City .... [D]iversity is not to be strangled by the
absolutism of imposed uniformity."57
Because the facts in Miller dealt with the mass mailing of allegedly obscene printed material, the Court's holding meant that local
community standards should be used when examining obscenity in
58
print media. However, publishers challenged the application of

51

Id. ("The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the
work . . . appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct ... ; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
52 Id.
53
Id. at 30-34.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56
Id. at 30.
57
Id. at 32-33.
58
Id. at 16-18.
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Miller to other media,59 relying on the Court's assertion that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
. Amendment standard s app l"1ed to th em. " 60
Frrst
Twice, the Supreme Court firmly reiterated that for traditional
media, the local community standard for obscenity the proper standard. 61 The Court has noted that even though a local standard approach might dissuade the publication of otherwise protected materials (because the publisher "would be unwilling to risk criminal con62
viction by testing variations in standards from place to place" ), the
Court concluded that the local standard best balanced the advantages
and disadvantages associated with using either standard. By using
local standards, publishers could tailor their messages by controlling
63
the geographic locations where their messages would be published.
Thus, for communications by mail, telephone, radio, and television,
obscenity is determined using a local standard that is tied to the geo64
graphic space where the work was distributed.

59

E.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (obscenity charges against a "dial-a-porn" operator).
60 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
61 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 116 ("There is no constitutional barrier under Miller
to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities under loc~l
standards even though they are not obscene in others."); see also Hamling v. Umted
States, 418 U.S. 87, 104, 106 (1974) ("A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinag~ from which he
comes for making the required determination, ... "[A] federal obscemty case may be
tried on local community standards.").
62 Miller, 413 U.S. at 34 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194-95
(1964)).
63 See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106 ("The fact that distributors of allegedly
obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various
federal judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of application of uniform national
standards of obscenity."); see Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26 ("If Sable's audience is
comprised of different communities with different local standards, Sable [the publisher] ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene
messages.").
64 While there is some nuance to the definition of the geographic contours of
the local community, the Court has held that the community standards are informed
by the geographic space where the obscene material was received. ~ee Jenkin~ v. ,, .
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (holding that "States have considerable latitude m
framing the geographic contours of the community, ranging from leaving the boundary undefined, or defining the local community using precise boundaries); see, e.g.,
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1974) (allowing the community standards to
be defined by the geographic limits of the State of California).
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viction by testing variations in standards from place to place" ), the
Court concluded that the local standard best balanced the advantages
and disadvantages associated with using either standard. By using
local standards, publishers could tailor their messages by controlling
63
the geographic locations where their messages would be published.
Thus, for communications by mail, telephone, radio, and television,
obscenity is determined using a local standard that is tied to the geo64
graphic space where the work was distributed.

59

E.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (obscenity charges against a "dial-a-porn" operator).
60 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
61 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 116 ("There is no constitutional barrier under Miller
to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities under loc~l
standards even though they are not obscene in others."); see also Hamling v. Umted
States, 418 U.S. 87, 104, 106 (1974) ("A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinag~ from which he
comes for making the required determination, ... "[A] federal obscemty case may be
tried on local community standards.").
62 Miller, 413 U.S. at 34 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194-95
(1964)).
63 See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106 ("The fact that distributors of allegedly
obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various
federal judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of application of uniform national
standards of obscenity."); see Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26 ("If Sable's audience is
comprised of different communities with different local standards, Sable [the publisher] ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene
messages.").
64 While there is some nuance to the definition of the geographic contours of
the local community, the Court has held that the community standards are informed
by the geographic space where the obscene material was received. ~ee Jenkin~ v. ,, .
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (holding that "States have considerable latitude m
framing the geographic contours of the community, ranging from leaving the boundary undefined, or defining the local community using precise boundaries); see, e.g.,
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1974) (allowing the community standards to
be defined by the geographic limits of the State of California).
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B. Ashcroft and the Web Gone Wild: How the Lack of Geographic Controls Made the Court Doubt the Applicability
of Local Community Standards to the Internet
Miller established "local community standards" as the appropriate
gauge for determining obscenity in traditional media. But when the
Internet emerged as a new medium divorced from real-world geography, the extension of traditional obscenity law became problematic.
Online content was available nationwide, and the Court became concerned that using local community standards might chill too much free
speech. 65
Ashcroft v. ACLU ("Ashcroft I") is the most recent decision in
which the Supreme Court raises the question of whether local standards apply to online content. 66 In 1998, Congress, alarmed by the rise
in obscenity and indecency on the Internet, and fearing easy access by
67
minors, passed the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"). COPA
copied the Miller criteria nearly verbatim to define online material
prohibited by the Act, including "applying contemporary community
standards" to determine whether material appealed to the prurient
interest. 68
A number of Justices were concerned that applying local standards to a medium with inherently national content would chill too
much speech. 69 Thus, Ashcroft I fragmented into at least five distinct
opinions, with no clear consensus on whether local, national, or some
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other community standard should be used for the new online medium
70
in which geographic control was nonexistent.
71
The plurality opinion (fully endorsed by Justices Thomas,
Scalia, and Rehnquist, and joined in part by Justices O'Connor and
Breyer) noted that while there was no requirement that the community
standards had to be tied to some precise geography, it was inevitable
that jurors will draw upon their respective local communities to determine if a work is obscene. 72 The plurality further noted that the
unique characteristics associated with the Internet did not justify
adopting a different approach to obscenity, and posited that the con73
tinued application of a local standard to the Internet was tolerable.
Recognizing the need for some consensus, Justices Thomas, Scalia,
and Rehnquist conceded their position and merely ended the plurality
opinion by stating that, "[t]he scope of our decision today is quite
limited. We hold only that COPA's reliance on community standards
to identify [obscene material] does not by itself render the statute [unconstitutional]."74 Thus, COPA was not struck down for its use of
local standards, but instead was remanded to the lower court with instructions to determine if there were other reasons that made COPA
75
unconstitutional.
In a separate opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment,76 Justice O'Connor felt compelled to "express [her] own
views on the constitutionality and desirability of adopting a national

70

See infra notes 71-96; see generally Reid, supra note 40.
Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 566-86 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
72 Id. at 576-77 ("[C]ommunity standards need not be defined by reference
to precise geographic area.... Absent geographic specification, a juror applying
community standards will inevitably draw upon personal knowledge of the community or vicinage from which he comes.") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
73 Id. at 583 ("While Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens question the applicability of this Court's community standards jurisprudence to the Internet, we do not
believe that the medium's 'unique characteristics' justify adopting a different approach than that set forth in Hamling and Sable [i.e. using local community standards].").
74 Id. at 585 (emphasis in the original). Eight Justices agreed with the decision to not overrule COPA on the use of local community standards, and the various
opinions reiterated the narrowness of their agreement. See id. at 576 (Thomas, J.,
plurality opinion) ("[W]e do not think it prudent to engage in speculation [about
community standards] and deciding this case does not require us to do so."); Id. at
596 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In any event, we need not decide
whether [COPA] invokes local or national community standards to conclude that
vacatur and remand are in order.").
75
Id. at 586.
76 Id. at 586-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment).
71

65 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-88 (1997) (expressing concern that
using "community standards" when regulating online content could cause it to "be
judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message");
66
Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
67
47 U.S.C. § 231 (2010) (criminalizing the distribution of obscene material
to minors); see also 2 GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE
INTERNET § 12.02, 12-32 to 12-66.1 (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing Congress' attempt to
regulate the Internet through COPA).
68
47 U.S.C. § 231(6) (2010).
69
Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using a local community standard "would potentially suppress
an inordinate amount of expression"); id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (using a local community standard "would provide the
most puritan of communities with a heckler's veto affecting the rest of the Nation");
id. at 594-96 (Kennedy, J., with whom Souter, J., & Ginsburg, J., join, concurring in
the judgment) (using a local community standard could lead web publishers to avoid
using the Internet because they cannot control who receives their content); id. at 612
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (using local community standards would remove all online
speech that was intolerable to the least-tolerant community).
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standard for obscenity regulation on the Internet."77 She explained
using a local standard would chill too much speech, "effectively
forc[ing] all speakers on the Web to abide by the most puritan community's standards."78 Given Internet publishers' "inability to control
the geographic location of their audience," requiring such publishers
to control where their speech was received would be unduly burdensome, and would "potentially suppress an inordinate amount of expression."79 Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, a national standard
would be less chilling for Internet speech. However, Justice O'Connor
concluded by noting that although she wished the Court would "explicitly adopt[] a national standard for defining obscenity on the Internet,"80 she agreed with the plurality that under the circumstances of
the case, local standards alone were not sufficient to invalidate
COPA. 81
In a contrasting opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, 82 Justice Breyer argued that Congress never intended for
COPA to apply a local standard, but instead intended to apply a "nationally uniform adult-based standard" to online content. 83 He argued
that although a juror might inevitably use his own local standards to
judge obscenity, such variations would be minor and would not invalidate a national standard. 84 Notwithstanding his advocacy of a national standard, Justice Breyer conceded that the use of local standards
was tolerable and, as such, did not invalidate COPA. 85
In a fourth opinion, Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg expressed their own concerns about both the national and local standards. 86 They agreed with the plurality that local standards are sometimes appropriate; 87 however, they were also concerned that the
unique characteristics of the Internet may "justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to [the Internet]."88 The three Justices noted that applying a local standard in other media was tolerable
because publishers could easily target their audience geographically. 89
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In contrast, using a local standard to judge online content presented a
"particular burden on Internet speech" due to inevitable variation
among the nation's communities. 90 Nevertheless, the three Justices
could not decide which standard was appropriate in this case and
merely concurred in the judgment. 91
In the fifth and final opinion, Justice Stevens provided the only
dissent. 92 Justice Stevens reasoned that because Internet publishers
have no control over where their content is distributed, using the
community standards set forth in Miller leads to overbreadth in any
application to online content. 93 Stevens principally disagreed with the
plurality's acceptance of local standards for the Internet; but he also
criticized Justice Kennedy's opinion. 94 Although Justice Stevens conceded that obscene "hard-core pornography ... does not belong on the
Internet," he nevertheless felt that "applying community standards to
the Internet will restrict a substantial amount of protected speech,"
because the "sorting mechanism [present in other geographically
linked media] does not exist in cyberspace."95 Justice Stevens did not
propose some other standard or criterion for obscenity on the Internet-he merely disagreed with using community standards as detailed
by the other Justices. 96
It is notable that each opinion (and thus every Justice of the
Court) lamented the fact that online technology lacked the same geographic controls available in all other media. 97
Ashcroft I thus provides little guidance about how to determine
obscenity online, instead leaving lower courts with the unenviable
task of interpreting Ashcroft I to decide which community standard, if
any, should apply to the Internet. Since eight Justices concurred in the
judgment, the most that can be said is that using local standards does
98
not automatically condemn Internet regulation as unconstitutional.
90

Id. at 597.
Id. at 591-602 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
92
Id. at 602-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 605-06.
94
Id. at 605-06, 609-11.
95
Id. at611-12.
96
See id. at602-12.
97
See id. at568,575,577,580-82,583,587,590,595-596,605-606.
Ashcroft I wasn't the first time the Court wished the Internet had more geographic
controls. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) ("[I]t is not currently possible
to exclude persons from accessing certain messages on the basis of their identity.").
98
See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656, 664 (2004) (stating the
"holding [in Ashcroft I was] that the community-standards language did not, standing
alone, make the statute unconstitutionally overbroad."). In Ashcroft II, the Court
found that COPA was unconstitutional, but only on the grounds that the statute's
language was overbroad, with little discussion of whether local community standards
91

77
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80
81
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83
84
85
86
87
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89
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.

at 586.
at 577.
at 587.
at 589.
at 589-91 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
at 591.
at 589.
at 591-602 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
at 594.
at 595.
at 595-97.
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But, knowing that the use of local standards to regulate the Internet
might not be unconstitutional does not provide clear guidance about
whether the Court should use local standards for Internet obscenity.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: SPLITTING THE CIRCUITS
Obscenity is whatever happens to shock some elderly and ignorant magistrate. 99
- Bertrand Russell
Because of the Supreme Court's vague, noncommittal, and fractured holding in Ashcroft I, lower courts have to grapple with Internet
obscenity cases without the clarion guidance of whether a local or
national community standard applies. Two recent United States
Courts of Appeals decisions stand on opposite sides of this issue, and
highlight the main theories behind the arguments for applying one
standard over the other to Internet obscenity cases. 100
A. The Ninth Circuit: Kilbride and the National Community
Standard
In October 2009, the Ninth Circuit "squarely turned its back" 101
on the long-standing local community standard used by courts when
analyzing all other forms of media. 102 In United States v. Kilbride the
Ninth Circuit ruled that national community standards should be applied to the Internet because the Internet was so completely devoid of
geographic controls. 103
The defendants (Jeffrey Kilbride and James Schaffer) began advertising borderline-obscene porn via email in 2003. 104 They earned a
commission every time an email recipient used links in his or her
tied to geography should or should not be used for Internet obscenity cases. See id. at
664-70.
99
What They Are Saying, LOOK MAGAZINE, Feb. 23 1954 at 26.
100
'
'
See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming
the use of a local community standard); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding that the jury should have applied a national community standard).
101
Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases?
The Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's Groundbreaking Understanding of Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REv. 47, 53 (2010).
102 Id.
103
Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250--55.
104
Id. at 1244-45 ("Defendants' convictions arose from ... their business of
sending unsolicited bulk email ... advertising adult websites").
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email to access and pay for online content. But the emails contained
more than mere links-they also had graphic images of extreme sex
acts, 106 which compelled over 662,000 people who received the mes107
sages to complain to the Federal Trade Commission. The two men
were charged with distributing obscene material in violation of Federal obscenity law. 108 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it
could use the community standards of "society at large, or people in
general," and that the community they "should consider ... is not defined by a precise geographic area." 109 The jury found the two men
guilty of distributing obscenity, and they were sentenced to approxi. years of.Jal·1-time.
.
110
mate1y f 1ve
The defendants appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were
prejudicial and plainly erroneous. They reasoned that because they
had no control over where their email spam would be downloaded, a
fully national standard should apply. 111 Thus, the defendants argued
the jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they
failed to adequately inform the jury that when using community standards to judge obscenity, the jury should consider nothing less than
the nation-wide community. 112 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendants that a national standard should apply to Internet obscenity
cases, but at the same time, held that the jury instructions were not
113
plainly erroneous under a national community standard.
The Ninth Circuit arrived at this decision by first interpreting
114
what it considered to be the holding of Ashcroft /. The court em105 Id. ("If a recipient of the Defendants' emails signed onto the advertised
website and paid a fee, Defendants earned a commission from the entity promoted,").
106 See Indictment at 14-15, United States v. Kilbride, No. 2:05-cr-00870DGC (D. Ariz. Aug. 25, 2005), ECF No. 1.
107 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1245 ("The Government also presented evidence of
over 662,000 complaints received by the FTC from around the country concerning
Defendants' emails.").
108 Id. (The charges included violations of 18 U.S.C. §1037(a)(3), 18 U.S.C. §
1037(a)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1462, 18 U.S.C. § 1465, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. §
2257).
109
Id. at 1248.
110
See id. at 1245.
111
Id. at 1247.
112 See Appellants' Joint Opening Brief at 33-40, United States v. Kilbride,
584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-10528), 2008 WL 4127267 at *33-40.
113 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254-55 ("A national community standard must be
applied in regulation obscene speech on the internet ... [but] the court has never held
that a jury may in no case be instructed to apply a national community standard in
finding obscenity.").
114 Id. at 1252-55 ("COPA's reliance on community standards does not by
itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment").
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102 Id.
103
Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250-55.
104
Id. at 1244-45 ("Defendants' convictions arose from ... their business of
sending unsolicited bulk email ... advertising adult websites").

email to access and pay for online content. But the emails contained
more than mere links-they also had graphic images of extreme sex
acts, 106 which compelled over 662,000 people who received the mes107
sages to complain to the Federal Trade Commission. The two men
were charged with distributing obscene material in violation of Federal obscenity law. 108 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it
could use the community standards of "society at large, or people in
general," and that the community they "should consider ... is not defined by a precise geographic area." 109 The jury found the two men
guilty of distributing obscenity, and they were sentenced to approxi110
mately five years of jail-time.
The defendants appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were
prejudicial and plainly erroneous. They reasoned that because they
had no control over where their email spam would be downloaded, a
fully national standard should apply. 111 Thus, the defendants argued
the jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they
failed to adequately inform the jury that when using community standards to judge obscenity, the jury should consider nothing less than
the nation-wide community .112 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendants that a national standard should apply to Internet obscenity
cases, but at the same time, held that the jury instructions were not
113
plainly erroneous under a national community standard.
The Ninth Circuit arrived at this decision by first interpreting
114
what it considered to be the holding of Ashcroft /. The court em105 Id. ("If a recipient of the Defendants' emails signed onto the advertised
website and paid a fee, Defendants earned a commission from the entity promoted,").
106 See Indictment at 14-15, United States v. Kilbride, No. 2:05-cr-00870DGC (D. Ariz. Aug. 25, 2005), ECF No. 1.
107 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1245 ("The Government also presented evidence of
over 662,000 complaints received by the FTC from around the country concerning
Defendants' emails.").
108 Id. (The charges included violations of 18 U.S.C. §1037(a)(3), 18 U.S.C. §
1037(a)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1462, 18 U.S.C. § 1465, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. §
2257).
109
Id. at 1248.
110
See id. at 1245.
111
Id. at 1247.
112 See Appellants' Joint Opening Brief at 33-40, United States v. Kilbride,
584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-10528), 2008 WL 4127267 at *33-40.
113 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254-55 ("A national community standard must be
applied in regulation obscene speech on the internet ... [but] the court has never held
that a jury may in no case be instructed to apply a national community standard in
finding obscenity.").
114 Id. at 1252-55 ("COPA's reliance on community standards does not by
itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment").
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ployed the Marks Rule, which requires that "[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds." 115 Thus, the Ninth Circuit examined the five fragmented opinions of Ashcroft/, and by overlapping
the various concurrences, concluded that the narrowest grounds upon
which a holding could be based was that "while application of a national community standard would not or may not create constitutional
concern, application of local community standards likely would." 116
Notwithstanding its conclusion that national standards should be
applied to Internet obscenity cases, the court upheld the defendants'
convictions because the jury instructions had been adequate. 117 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that plain error is found only when the case
law is "clear and obvious," and the district court fails to follow that
clear and obvious precedent. 118 But, because the case law was not
clear and had required the Ninth Circuit to divine a holding from
Ashcroft I, the district court had not committed clear and obvious error
by giving jury instructions requiring less than a fully national standard
for judging online obscenity. 119
It is noteworthy that the Kilbride court lamented that online publishers are not able to tailor their message for specific geographic areas like they can in traditional media. 120

B. The Eleventh Circuit: Little and the Local Community
Standard
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Little concluded the opposite of Kilbride: local standards
should apply to Internet obscenity cases. 121 Interestingly, the Eleventh
Circuit marked this circuit-splitting opinion to remain unpublished. 122
115

Id. at 1253-54 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976))
(internal quotations omitted).
116
Id. at 1254.
117
Id. at 1255 ("In light ofour holding, the district court's jury instructions
defining obscenity pursuant to Hamling was error. However, this error does not require reversal because the district court's error was far from plain").
118 Id.
119

Id. at 1255 ("[O]ur conclusion was far from clear and obvious to the district court. Hence, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible error in
its §§ 1462 and 1465 jury instructions").
120
Id. at 1250-51.
121
United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 166 (11th Cir. 2010).
122
See generally id.
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Defendant Paul Little, a.k.a. Max Hardcore, moved to California
123
and began producing pornographic films in the early 1990s. Mr.
Little's pornography pushed the boundaries of decency, and his selfdescribed "vile and crazy" 124 videos garnered negative attention both
inside and outside the porn industry, 125 including the attention of the
Federal government.
In 2007, the Department of Justice conducted an investigation into
the content on Mr. Little's website, 126 after which it indicted Mr. Little
for distributing obscenity .127 One mild description of the videos stated
that they portrayed "abusive sexual acts between adult males and females dressed to look and act like minor children," including, "simu. d.1ctment, Mr. L.1tt1e
lated rape" and other extreme sex acts. 128 After m
moved to dismiss the case because it had relied on a local community
standard, arguing that after Ashcroft/, local standards could not constitutionally apply to Internet obscenity. 129 The trial court dismissed
the motion to dismiss, holding that local standards still applied to the
Internet. 130 At trial the district judge noted "it would be very difficult
for the jury to sit through five of these [videos]," and after viewing
some of the videos the jury passed a note to the judge begging that
123
See THE INTERNET Movrn DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0362065/bio (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); EXCALIBUR
FILMS, http://www.excaliburfilms.com/pornlist/starpgs/Max_Hardcore.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
124 Steve C., Interview with Legendary Adult Director Max Hardcore,
FOUNDRYMUSIC.COM (July 20, 2005),
http://www.foundrymusic.com/bands/displayinterview .cfm?id= 130.
125 Peter S. Scholtes, Devil in the Flesh, CITYPAGES.COM (Jan 14, 1998),
http://www.citypages.com/1998-01-14/arts/devil-in-the-flesh/1 ("Hardcore is among
the most hated men in the [porn] industry. He's rumored to have put several actresses
in the hospital, and most starlets refuse to work with him.").
126 Order at 1, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D.
Fla. Jan 16, 2008), ECF No. 64, 2008 WL 151875 at *1.
127 Indictment, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D.
Fla. May 17, 2007), ECF No. 1, 2007 WL 4401063.
128 Government's Response and Memorandum to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss at 2, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4,
2008), ECF No. 63, 2007 WL 2809549 at *2 (internal quotations omitted); see also
Susannah Breslin, To the Max, THE REVERSE COWGIRL (Oct. 6, 2008, 8:53 PM),
http://reversecowgirlblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/to-max.html (describing Hardcore's
videos in which "women are verbally and physically degraded in an unprecedented
myriad of ways," which "[e]ven for the most jaded porn watcher, Little's oeuvre is
over the top. Watching Little's work is less like watching a porn movie than it is akin
to witnessing a vivisection.").
129 Defendants Max World Entm't. Inc. and Paul Little's Motion to Dismiss
Indictment at 19-21 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2007), ECF No.
56, 2007 WL 4401064 at *19-21; see also Order supra note 126, at 2.
130

Order, supra note 126, at 2.

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1

172

ployed the Marks Rule, which requires that "[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds." 115 Thus, the Ninth Circuit examined the five fragmented opinions of Ashcroft/, and by overlapping
the various concurrences, concluded that the narrowest grounds upon
which a holding could be based was that "while application of a national community standard would not or may not create constitutional
concern, application of local community standards likely would." 116
Notwithstanding its conclusion that national standards should be
applied to Internet obscenity cases, the court upheld the defendants'
convictions because the jury instructions had been adequate. 117 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that plain error is found only when the case
law is "clear and obvious," and the district court fails to follow that
clear and obvious precedent. 118 But, because the case law was not
clear and had required the Ninth Circuit to divine a holding from
Ashcroft/, the district court had not committed clear and obvious error
by giving jury instructions requiring less than a fully national standard
for judging online obscenity. 119
It is noteworthy that the Kilbride court lamented that online publishers are not able to tailor their message for specific geographic areas like they can in traditional media. 120

B. The Eleventh Circuit: Little and the Local Community
Standard
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Little concluded the opposite of Kilbride: local standards
should apply to Internet obscenity cases. 121 Interesting! y, the Eleventh
Circuit marked this circuit-splitting opinion to remain unpublished. 122
115
Id. at 1253-54 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976))
(internal quotations omitted).
116
Id. at 1254.
117
Id. at 1255 ("In light ofour holding, the district court's jury instructions
defining obscenity pursuant to Hamling was error. However, this error does not require reversal because the district court's error was far from plain").
118 Id.
119

Id. at 1255 ("[O]ur conclusion was far from clear and obvious to the district court. Hence, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible error in
its§§ 1462 and 1465 jury instructions").
120
Id. at 1250-51.
121
United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 166 (11th Cir. 2010).
122
See generally id.

2 OBSCENITY STANDARDS, 1 NEAT SOLUTION

2011]

173

Defendant Paul Little, a.k.a. Max Hardcore, moved to California
123
and began producing pornographic films in the early 1990s. Mr.
Little's pornography pushed the boundaries of decency, and his selfdescribed "vile and crazy" 124 videos garnered negative attention both
inside and outside the porn industry, 125 including the attention of the
Federal government.
In 2007, the Department of Justice conducted an investigation into
the content on Mr. Little's website, 126 after which it indicted Mr. Little
for distributing obscenity .127 One mild description of the videos stated
that they portrayed "abusive sexual acts between adult males and females dressed to look and act like minor children," including, "simu. d.1ctment, Mr . L.1ttIe
lated rape" and other extreme sex acts. 128 Afterm
moved to dismiss the case because it had relied on a local community
standard, arguing that after Ashcroft /, local standards could not con129
stitutionally apply to Internet obscenity . The trial court dismissed
the motion to dismiss, holding that local standards still applied to the
Internet. 130 At trial the district judge noted "it would be very difficult
for the jury to sit through five of these [videos]," and after viewing
some of the videos the jury passed a note to the judge begging that
123
See THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0362065/bio (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); EXCALIBUR
FILMS, http://www.excaliburfilms.com/pornlist/starpgs/Max_Hardcore.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
124
Steve C., Interview with Legendary Adult Director Max Hardcore,
FOUNDRYMUSIC.COM (July 20, 2005),
http://www.foundrymusic.com/bands/displayinterview .cfm?id= 130.
125 Peter S. Scholtes, Devil in the Flesh, CITYPAGES.COM (Jan 14, 1998),
http://www.citypages.com/1998-01-14/arts/devil-in-the-flesh/1 ("Hardcore is among
the most hated men in the [porn] industry. He's rumored to have put several actresses
in the hospital, and most starlets refuse to work with him.").
126 Order at 1, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D.
Fla. Jan 16, 2008), ECF No. 64, 2008 WL 151875 at *1.
127 Indictment, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D.
Fla. May 17, 2007), ECF No. 1, 2007 WL 4401063.
128 Government's Response and Memorandum to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss at 2, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4,
2008), ECF No. 63, 2007 WL 2809549 at *2 (internal quotations omitted); see also
Susannah Breslin, To the Max, THE REVERSE COWGIRL (Oct. 6, 2008, 8:53 PM),
http://reversecowgirlblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/to-max.html (describing Hardcore's
videos in which "women are verbally and physically degraded in an unprecedented
myriad of ways," which "[e]ven for the most jaded porn watcher, Little's oeuvre is
over the top. Watching Little's work is less like watching a porn movie than it is akin
to witnessing a vivisection.").
129 Defendants Max World Entm't. Inc. and Paul Little's Motion to Dismiss
Indictment at 19-21 8:07-cr-00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2007), ECF No.
56, 2007 WL 4401064 at *19-21; see also Order supra note 126, at 2.
130

Order, supra note 126, at 2.

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1

174

they only be required to view a few clips. 131 Mr. Little was convicted
of all ten counts of violating federal obscenity law, was sentenced to
almost four years in prison, three years of probation, and was fined
over $80,000. 132
On appeal Mr. Little argued that it was error to deny his motion to
dismiss the indictment. Mr. Little asserted that local community standards should not apply to the Internet because he had no power to
control the geographical areas into which his videos were published.133 The Eleventh Circuit summarily rejected this argument in
four short sentences. The court noted that three months earlier the
Ninth Circuit in Kilbride had interpreted the holding in Ashcroft I "in
such a way as to mandate a national community standard for Internetbased material." 134 However, the Eleventh Circuit "decline[d] to follow the reasoning of Kilbride," stating that the portions of Ashcroft I
"that advocated a national community standard were dicta, not the
ruling of the court." 135 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that using
local community standards under Miller "remains the standard by
which the Supreme Court has directed us to judge obscenity, on the
Internet and elsewhere." 136 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Mr.
Little's conviction. However, due to a sentencing enhancement error,
the case was remanded to the district court for re-sentencing. 137
The Kilbride and Little decisions illustrate how reasonable people
can interpret the Ashcroft I decision and arrive at contrasting conclusions. They also illustrate how the lack of Supreme Court direction
over which standard should be used for online obscenity cases could
lead to even more splits among the circuits. It is noteworthy that the
Little court-like the Kilbride court and the U.S. Supreme Courtlamented that online publishers have no means to tailor their message
like they can in traditional media. 138
131

Clay Calvert, Judicial Erosion of Protection for Defendants in Obscenity
Prosecutions?: When Courts Say, Literally, Enough is Enough and When Internet
Availability Does Not Mean Acceptance, 1 HARV. J. OF SPORTS & ENT. L. 7, 22
(2010); see Clerk's Minutes-General at 1, United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr00170-SCB-TBM (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2008), ECF No. 127 ("Playing of the dvds
continued in open court. ... A note is sent to the Judge by one of the jurors .... Viewing of the dvds continues.")
132
United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2010).
133
Brief Of Defendants-Appellants Paul F. Little and Max World Ent., Inc. at
13-17, United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159 (11th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15964),
2009 WL 506653 at *13-17.
134
Little, 365 F. App'x at 164.
135
Id. at 164 & n.10.
136 Id.
137
Id. at 169.
138
Id. at 163.
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III. AVAILABLE AT AN INTERNET NEAR YOU:
GEOTARGETING

Reasonable people may debate about whether a local or national
standard should apply to the Internet. But, a recent technological development will end the debate and provide the Court with a good reason to apply local community standards for online content just as it
has done for all other media. This development, geotargeting, allows
online publishers to control where their content is accessible.
While there are already a number of reasons why the Court should
apply local community standards to the Internet (such as incorrect
139
attempts to interpret Ashcroft I as advocating national standards, the
140
impossibility of administering a national standard, and the greater
139
The Court explicitly stated that no other holding should be extrapolated
from the Ashcroft I decision. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit court erroneously applied the Marks Rule. Compare supra note 103
(explaining how Kilbride's use of the Marks Rule on the Ashcroft I opinion was incorrect because it disregarded prior Supreme Court precedent and failed to apply
correct interpretive principles), with Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46
(1994) (signaling that the Marks inquiry should not be pursued to the "utmost logical
possibility .... "), and Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Plurality Decisions, 80 COL. L. REV. 756, 763 (1980) (explaining that although the
Marks Rule can be used in some cases, "[m]ore often, however, there is no clear and
explicit agreement on the reasoning supporting the result; instead, two essentially
distinct rationales are proposed, and the overlap, if any, is merely implicit."), and
Evan H. Carminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tux. L. REv. 1, 15 (1994) ("[T]here may not be a
single dispositional rule endorsed by a majority of the judges. Instead, the disposition
may be supported only by an individual or plurality opinion combined with one or
more opinions concurring in the judgment. In such event, according to the conventional model, the case establishes no precedential rule. Rather, a decision establishes a
legal rule with precedential status only if a majority of judges invoke the same dispositional rule to justify the same disposition, typically embodied within an 'opinion of
the court."').
140
Another reason is that using a national standard would prove impossible to
administer in court proceedings. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30
(1973) (stating that in order to create a record of what the national standard is, which
is "essentially a question[] of fact," it would necessitate asking a trier-of-fact to plumb
the depths of the nation's opinion which would amount to "an exercise in futility"),
with Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-05 (1974) (analyzing the "difficulty
of formulating uniform national standards" and concluding "[n]othing in the First
Amendment requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'national standards' when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene
as a matter of fact.") (internal quotations omitted), and Jacobellis v. State of Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964) (Warren, Chief J., dissenting) ("I believe that there is no
provable 'national standard' and perhaps there should be none. At all events, this
Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local
courts to divine one.").
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ill. AVAILABLE AT AN INTERNET NEAR YOU:
GEOTARGETING
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.
ch1·11·mg ef:Ciects of a nat10nal
standard 141 ), the most important reason is
that Internet users have developed and deployed a technologygeotargeting-that allows online publishers to control where their
content is received. The conflict between local and national standards
for online obscenity springs from the idea that there were no intrinsic
geographic controls similar to those in other traditional mediageotargeting resolves the issue by giving online publishers the same
power they have in all other media to target their audience.
This section will give a short history of geotargeting, will explain
how online geotargeting provides publishers of prurience the power to
target particular geographic areas, and will conclude with a proposal
for a modified local standard that can be used for online obscenity.
A. The History and Ever Expanding Use of Geotargeting On
the Internet
Many assume that it is impossible to link active users of the Internet to a geographical location. 142 However, this was not the case when
the Internet was first created, and is not the case now.
Throughout the first stages of the Internet's existence, users were
requested to register with a central database, linking each user to a
real-world name, physical mailing address, telephone number and
~
'
network mailbox. The central database tracked the real-world locations of users until the 1990s, when, in the interest of creating competitive balance, registration with the database was deregulated and
additional registrars were permitted to assign Internet domain
141

Using a local standard provides the least-tolerant community with veto
power on a nation-wide medium, thereby chilling the speech of the most tolerant of
speakers; in contrast, a national standard forces obscene content on unwilling comn;iunities while it prevents ultra-tolerant communities from being able to publish prunent content they could otherwise publish under the local standard. See supra notes
56-57 and accompanying text; compare Matthew Towns, Note, The Community
Standards of Utah and the Amish Country Rule the World Wide Web, 68 Mo. L. REV.
735, 740-43 (2003) (explaining how under a local standard online speech would be
chilled by giving the least-tolerant community a heckler's veto), with John V. Edwards, Note, Obscenity in the Age Of Direct Broadcast Satellite: A Final Burial for
Stanley v. Georgia(?), A National Obscenity Standard, and Other Miscellany, 33 WM.
& ~ARY L. REv. 949, 992 (1992) (explaining that a national standard "compromis[es]
the mterests of both the least tolerant and the most tolerant communities")
142
.
See Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other
Means of Placing Borders on the 'Borderless' Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL}. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 101, 101 (2004).
143
Network Working Group, NICNAMEIWHOIS, INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE 1 (Oct. 1985), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc954 (requesting early Internet
users to be linked to real-world locations through registry with the WHOIS database).
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names. 144 As more registrars were allowed, the database grew more
complex and less transparent, 145 leading many to believe that the
Internet's decentralized design and global reach made it technologi146
cally impossible to connect to real-world geography.
Recent technological advances are recreating real-world borders
on the previously borderless Internet making it much easier to connect
147
One sophisticated
each Internet user to a real-world location.
method uses Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with each
148
Typically a geodomain registry to track the location of users.
location company "maps" all the domains and their associated IP addresses to their real-world locations and stores that large amount of
information into a private database. 149 When a user seeks to access a
certain website, his or her originating IP address can be compared to
the records in the database, giving an educated guess about the accessseeker' s location. 150 Online advertisers and publishers of all types
currently use geotargeting because it gives them the power to show
customized messages to geographically defined audiences, which
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maximizes advertising dollars and provides hyper-local responses to
online queries. 151
Thus, geo-location companies help advertisers or other Internet
~ublishe:s quickly. ~nd efficiently locate their audience through such
mform~t10n as a vlSltor's country, region, city, latitude, longitude, zip
code, time zone, area code, local weather, and more. 152 There are
websites that provide free, easy-to-use geolocation software that is
99.5% accurate on a country level, and 60% accurate at the city
153
allowing· website designers to create customized lists that
level,
block as many (or as few) countries or cities as they wish from accessing a website's online content. 154

B. How Geotargeting Gives Online Publishers the Power to
Target Their Audience by Geography, Just as in Other
Media
As noted in Ashcroft I, Little, and Kilbride, courts have often lamented the fact that web publishers do not have the ability to control
the geographic scope of the recipients of their communications, imply~ng th~t if online publishers could control the geographic scope of
their postmgs, the Court would be more willing to impose local community standards on the Internet, just as it has imposed local standards

~ee B.ob T~deschi, Borderless is Out; Advertisers Now Want to Know if a
Customer Lzves zn Cazro, Egypt, or Cairo, Ill., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at C.10; see
e.g., Geotargeting, GOOGLE.COM,
http://:':'w.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=62399
~last v1s1ted .Nov. 13, 20_11) (describing how webmasters can use Google's geotargetmg tool ~Jo mcrease therr exposure to users in a specific geographic area).
1 Svantesson, supra note 142, at 110. See id. at 111 n.40 (listing eight popular geolocation companies); Demo, GEOBYTES.COM,
http://www.geobytes.com/demo.htm (last modified Aug. 29, 2006) (providing a lessthan-cla~sy, but very informative, demonstration of the information available using
geolocatton software, as well as how easy it is to use geolocation software). Since Mr.
Svantesson's article, additional companies have entered and dominated the market
such MaxMind who offers the robust and regularly updated GeoIP Database. See '
Ma:x:Mind's IP Intelligence Solution, MAXMIND.COM,
http://www.maxmind.com/app/ip-locate (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); cf. Randall
~unroe, GeoIP, X_KCD.COM, http://xkcd.com/713 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (providmg a humorous spm on how the GeoIP database can be used to create hyper-local
advertisements).
153
IPINFoDB, http://ipinfodb.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (follow the "IP
L_o~ation API" hyperlink); see also GEOPLUGIN, http://www.geoplugin.com (last
vlSlted Nov. 13, 2011).
154 IP
lNFoDB supra note 153 (follow the "Block IP by Country" hyperlink).
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on previous media. 155 Geolocation provides the Court with the answer.
Purveyors of prurient publications can presently employ powerful
tools to publish their products into predetermined precincts. And although not yet fully capable of granular targeting at the street or house
level, geotargeting is capable of targeting particular cities and zip
.
1 .
. 156
co des, and 1s constant y 1mprovmg.
Some commentators have postulated that geolocation software
157
may already be accurate enough for legal purposes. There are ways
to fool geolocation software, 158 but for the first time since Ashcroft I,
it is possible for web publishers such as Paul Little (a.k.a. Max Hardcore) to deliberately target those communities tolerant of violent and
extreme pornography, and avoid publishing in communities that find
such content obscene. Already, at least one foreign country and one
state legislature have considered using geolocation to regulate online
159
content.

C. A Proposal to Use Local Community Standards to Gauge
Online Obscenity, Justified by Geotargeting
As the fusion of geography with the Internet becomes more and
more complete, the Court will be able to comfortably apply the reasoning it applied in traditional obscenity law. Specifically, instead of
using a national standard that is hard to determine, and imposes too
many burdens on free speech, a local standard should be used to determine obscenity on the Internet. As noted in Miller, using local

151

155 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 571, 573 (2002); United States v. Little,
365 F. App'x 159, 163 (1 lth Cir. 2010); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240,
1252 (9th Cir. 2009).
156 See Digital Element Finding Demand for Granular IP Targeting Says CoFounder Friedman, .ADEXHANGER.COM (Aug. 20, 2009, 10:07 AM),
http://www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/digital-element-rob-friedman-iptargetinng/ (stating that early requests for IP targeting were only at the country level,
but recent developments are making targeting as granular as cities or even zip codes
possible, creating a "hyperlocal" experience); see, e.g., Bamba Gueye et al., Constraint-Based Geolocation of Internet Hosts, 14 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
NETWORKING 1219 (2006), available at http://www.slac.stanford.edu/comp/net/wanmon/tulip (search that webpage for "December 2006"; then follow the "ConstraintBased Geolocation of Internet Hosts" link on that line; then follow the full-text "Pdf'
link) (detailing a new approach that improves upon traditional landmark-based geolocation techniques by using multiple landmarks to triangulate Internet hosts); see also
Blyth, supra note 147.
157 Svantesson, supra note 142 at 101-102.
158 See Nelson, supra note 148, at 1214-15; King, supra note 146, at 71.
159 Jason Krause, It's Location, Location ... Some Consider Geo location
Technology a Way to Settle Internet Disputes, 91 A.B.A. J. 18 (2005) (reporting that
France and Pennsylvania have considered using geolocation to enforce local laws).

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1

178

maximizes advertising dollars and provides hyper-local responses to
online queries. 151
Thus, geo-location companies help advertisers or other Internet
publishers quickly and efficiently locate their audience through such
inform~tion as a visitor's country, region, city, latitude, longitude, zip
code, time zone, area code, local weather, and more. 152 There are
websites that provide free, easy-to-use geolocation software that is
99.5% accurate on a country level, and 60% accurate at the city
153
level,
allowing website designers to create customized lists that
block as many (or as few) countries or cities as they wish from accessing a website's online content. 154

B. How Geotargeting Gives Online Publishers the Power to
Target Their Audience by Geography, Just as in Other
Media
As noted in Ashcroft I, Little, and Kilbride, courts have often lamented the fact that web publishers do not have the ability to control
the geographic scope of the recipients of their communications, imply~ng th~t if online publishers could control the geographic scope of
their postmgs, the Court would be more willing to impose local community standards on the Internet, just as it has imposed local standards

~ee B.ob T~deschi, Borderless is Out; Advertisers Now Want to Know if a
Customer Lives in Cairo, Egypt, or Cairo, Ill., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at C.10; see
e.g., Geotargeting, GOOGLE.COM,
http://www.google.corn/support/webmasters/bin/answer. py?hl=en&answer=62399
~last visited .Nov. 13, 20.11) (describing how webmasters can use Google's geotargetmg too\~io mcrease therr exposure to users in a specific geographic area).
Svantesson, supra note 142, at 110. See id. at 111 n.40 (listing eight popular geolocation companies); Demo, GEOBYTES.COM,
http://www.geobytes.com/demo.htm (last modified Aug. 29, 2006) (providing a lessthan-cla~sy, but very informative, demonstration of the information available using
geolocat10n software, as well as how easy it is to use geolocation software). Since Mr.
Svantesson' s article, additional companies have entered and dominated the market
such MaxMind who offers the robust and regularly updated GeoIP Database. See '
MaxMind's IP Intelligence Solution, MAXMIND.COM,
http://www.maxmind.com/app/ip-locate (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); cf Randall
~unroe, GeoIP, x.KCD.COM, http://xkcd.com/713 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (providmg a humorous spm on how the GeoIP database can be used to create hyper-local
advertisements).
153
IPINFoDB, http://ipinfodb.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (follow the "IP
L.o~ation API" hyperlink); see also GEOPLUGIN, http://www.geoplugin.com (last
VlSlted Nov. 13, 2011).
154 I
PlNFoDB supra note 153 (follow the "Block IP by Country" hyperlink).

2011]

2 OBSCENITY STANDARDS, 1 NEAT SOLUTION

179

on previous media. 155 Geolocation provides the Court with the answer.
Purveyors of prurient publications can presently employ powerful
tools to publish their products into predetermined precincts. And although not yet fully capable of granular targeting at the street or house
level, geotargeting is capable of targeting particular cities and zip
.
l .
. 156
codes, and 1s constant y 1mprovmg.
Some commentators have postulated that geolocation software
may already be accurate enough for legal purposes. 157 There are ways
to fool geolocation software, 158 but for the first time since Ashcroft I,
it is possible for web publishers such as Paul Little (a.k.a. Max Hardcore) to deliberately target those communities tolerant of violent and
extreme pornography, and avoid publishing in communities that find
such content obscene. Already, at least one foreign country and one
state legislature have considered using geolocation to regulate online
159
content.

C. A Proposal to Use Local Community Standards to Gauge
Online Obscenity, Justified by Geotargeting
As the fusion of geography with the Internet becomes more and
more complete, the Court will be able to comfortably apply the reasoning it applied in traditional obscenity law. Specifically, instead of
using a national standard that is hard to determine, and imposes too
many burdens on free speech, a local standard should be used to determine obscenity on the Internet. As noted in Miller, using local

151

155 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 571, 573 (2002); United States v. Little,
365 F. App'x 159, 163 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240,
1252 (9th Cir. 2009).
156 See Digital Element Finding Demand for Granular IP Targeting Says CoFounder Friedman, ADEXHANGER.COM (Aug. 20, 2009, 10:07 AM),
http://www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/digital-element-rob-friedman-iptargetinng/ (stating that early requests for IP targeting were only at the country level,
but recent developments are making targeting as granular as cities or even zip codes
possible, creating a "hyperlocal" experience); see, e.g., Bamba Gueye et al., Constraint-Based Geo location of Internet Hosts, 14 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
NETWORKlNG 1219 (2006), available at http://www.slac.stanford.edu/comp/net/wanmon/tulip (search that webpage for "December 2006"; then follow the "ConstraintBased Geolocation of Internet Hosts" link on that line; then follow the full-text "Pdf'
link) (detailing a new approach that improves upon traditional landmark-based geolocation techniques by using multiple landmarks to triangulate Internet hosts); see also
Blyth, supra note 147.
157 Svantesson, supra note 142 at 101-102.
158 See Nelson, supra note 148, at 1214-15; King, supra note 146, at 71.
159 Jason Krause, It's Location, Location ... Some Consider Geolocation
Technology a Way to Settle Internet Disputes, 91 AB.A. J. 18 (2005) (reporting that
France and Pennsylvania have considered using geolocation to enforce local laws).

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1

180

standards is preferable to using national standards; and through the
use of technologies such as geotargeting, Internet publishers now have
the ability to control the geographic areas where they want to publish,
giving them the ability to publish online without risking the heckler's
veto wielded by the most conservative of communities.
One dilemma associated with allowing the use of local standards
on the Internet is how the Court will deal with "eavesdroppers." In
other words, when a user in an area where the publisher did not intend
to publish uses spoofing or proxy methods to work-around the geolocation software and downloads the obscene material in a jurisdiction
where the publisher did not intend to distribute material. In such
cases, a modification of the Miller criteria would absolve the publisher of criminal liability. Instead of allowing all downloads to attach
liability to the publishers, only those downloads that were (1) intended
for that geographic area, as evidenced by the publisher's use of geotargeting software, or (2) explicitly or implicitly encouraged by the
publisher, as evidenced by the usual forms of inducement evidence,
could give rise to liability. Thus, the publishers would only liable
when they direct their work at an area, or through their actions or expressions, deliberately manipulate someone into downloading content
into a restricted geographic area. Under that modified standard, if the
recipient eavesdrops and purposely circumvents a publisher's geotargeting software, such as through proxies or mirrors, then the publisher
cannot be liable since he never intended to enter that geographic area.
In essence, a publisher whose material was unilaterally taken into an
unintended jurisdiction by a third party could not be held liable for
distributing obscenity because that state or region would not have
jurisdiction over the publisher. 160
This provides local communities some degree of autonomy and
control over what online content will be allowed in their communities
Gust as they currently have in traditional media), and avoids the uniformity of a national standard which would force conservative communities to protect otherwise obscene works; and more importantly,
allows the expression of free speech of borderline obscene material in
communities where it is tolerated, preventing the most prudish community from exercising a heckler's veto power over the Internet.
Thus, due to the widespread and pervasive use of geotargeting,
online publishers can be required to target the geographic areas in
which they wish to publish or face criminal consequences, which is
the same requirement as in other traditional media. The one exception
to this rule is that if the recipient takes affirmative steps to circumvent
160

Svantesson, supra note 142 at 103-04.
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the geotargeting controls, the publisher would not be liable so long as
he did not encourage circumvention. This prevents the Court from
going down a medium-specific analysis and instead uses the same
standard for all media. This proposed modified standard could be
similarly extended into any future media, so long as there is some
geographic control wielded by the publisher.

III. CONCLUSION
Obscenity, which is ever blasphemy against the divine beauty in
life ... is a monster for which the corruption of society forever brings
161
forth new food, which it devours in secret.
- Percy Bysshe Shelley
The law governing online obscenity is at a crossroads. For many
years traditional obscenity law used the standards of the local community to determine whether a published work was obscene, requiring
publishers of extreme content to target only the most tolerant of communities. But the Internet's global reach and open infrastructure
caused the Court to doubt the applicability of obscenity law to online
content, causing lower courts to split over whether the same local
standards should be used (such as the Eleventh Circuit in Little), or
whether a new national standard for obscenity should be used (such as
the Ninth Circuit in Kilbride). Geotargeting technology provides the
answer to the conundrum, giving publishers the same power to target
audiences as they had in the traditional media, thereby giving the
Court reason to reapply local standards to all content, be it traditional
or online media.
This all begs the question: if geotargeting is such a neat solution
for the community standards debate, when will the Court address the
issue? It likely won't be through Kilbride or Little, because both cases
were decided on harmless error grounds. 162 But, eventually the Court
will once again be asked which standard should be used for online
content. And as geotargeting technology continues to improve and be
used more widely, the Court will have a great reason to resolve the
issue in favor of using local standards to determine obscenity on the
161
PERCY BY SS HE SHELLEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY AND OTHER ESSAYS 34
(Kessinger Publishing 2004) (1891).
162
See Eugene Volokh, Eleventh Circuit Rejects Ninth Circuit's NationalStandard-for-Internet-Obscenity Decision, VOLOKH.COM (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:22 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/02/04/ eleventh-circuit-rejects-ninth-circuits-nationalstandard-for-internet-obscenity-decision/.
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http://volokh.com/2010/02/04/ eleventh-circuit-rejects-ninth-circuits-nationalstandard-for-internet-obscenity-decision/.
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Internet. Ultimately, in the battle between the two standards "there
'
can be only one." 163

THE WARRANTLESS USE OF GPS
TRACKING DEVICES:
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
RESTORED THROUGH APPLICATION
OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
David Myers *
INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement's use of Global Positioning System (GPS) devices continues to expand as the technology gains recognition as an
efficient, accurate, and inexpensive method to monitor a suspect' s
public movement in automobiles. 1 Federal courts have generally upheld the warrantless use of these devices and determined they do not
infringe an individual's Fourth Amendment right to a "reasonable
expectation of privacy". 2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, however, has recently held that the warrantless use
of GPS devices to monitor vehicle movements on public roads is
3
unlawful when used over a prolonged period. The D.C. Circuit based
this holding on the belief that long term GPS tracking reveals "the
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:1· HIGHLANDER, (Thom EMI Screen Entm't & Highlander Prod Ltd
·
·
1986), trailer available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSZOgxh2ZKQ&#t=lm53s (last visited Nov 13
2011).
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* David Myers graduated from Michigan State University with a Bachelor
of Arts degree in Accounting and a Master of Business Administration degree. Mr.
Myers also earned his Certified Public Accountant and Project Management Professional certifications. His legal academic honors include receipt of two merit scholarships, CALI awards in both Federal Income Tax and Strategic Representation and
Communication, and listing on the Dean's Honors List for the duration of his studies.
Mr. Myers interest in corporate and employment law arises from his fourteen years of
experience consulting with business clients in the banking, manufacturing, and technology industries. Upon graduation, Mr. Myers plans on pursuing a career as a transactional attorney focused on corporate issues.
1 Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns
Raised by Law Enforcement's Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking,
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2010).
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
3 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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